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EDITORIAL
A DEFENSE OF LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING
Delegate Mark Cole*
Virginia is one of thirty-six states in which the legislature holds
primary responsibility for the process of redrawing the lines of
legislative and congressional districts after the completion of each
decennial census.1 During the last two sessions of the Virginia General
Assembly, however, there have been concerted efforts by Governor Tim
Kaine, General Assembly Democrats, and a collection of interest groups
calling themselves the Virginia Redistricting Coalition to limit the
legislature's responsibility for redistricting. 2 In 2008 and 2009, those
efforts failed.3
. Member, Virginia House of Delegates since 2002, 88th District, Stafford, Spotsylvania, and Fauquier
Counties. B.S., 1980, Western Kentucky University; A.A.S, 1990, Germanna Community College;
B.L.S., 1993, Mary Washington College. Prior to serving in the House of Delegates, he was a member
of the Spotsylvania County Board of Supervisors for two years. Delegate Cole serves on the House
Finance and Education Committees and is Chairman of the Privileges and Elections Committee.
1. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, REDISTRICTING LAW 2010 178-79 app.B
(Draft Version 2009), available at http://www.senate.ni/departments/scr/redist/Red2010/
RedistrictingLaw 2010.pdf.
2. See Anita Kumar, Delegates Toss Early Voting, Redistricting Bills, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2009, at
B2; Virginia Redistricting Coalition, Home, http://www.fixthelines.org/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2009); see
also Virginia Redistricting Coalition, Coalition Members, http://www.fixthelines.org/
CoalitionMembers/tabid/564/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2009) (listing members of the
coalition).
3. H.B. 1685, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2009) (left in the House Privileges and Elections
Committee); H.B. 1793, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2009) (left in the House Privileges and
Elections Committee); H.B. 2538, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2009) (left in the House Privileges
and Elections Committee); H.J. Res. 702, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2009) (left in the House
Privileges and Elections Committee); S.B. 926, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2009) (left in the House
Privileges and Elections Committee); S.J. Res. 281, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2009) (left in the
Senate Privileges and Elections Committee); S.J. Res. 312, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2009) (left
in the Senate Privileges and Elections Committee); H.B. 339, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008)
(left in the House Privileges and Elections Committee); H.B. 836, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess.
2008) (left in the House Privileges and Elections Committee); H.B. 1070, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg.
Sess. 2008) (left in the House Privileges and Elections Committee); H.J. Res. 28, Va. Gen. Assembly
(Reg. Sess. 2008) (left in the House Privileges and Elections Committee); H.J. Res. 70, Va. Gen.
Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (left in the House Privileges and Elections Committee); H.J. Res. 120, Va.
Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (left in the House Privileges and Elections Committee); H.J. Res.
181, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (left in the House Privileges and Elections Committee); S.B.
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Proponents of plans that would reduce or mitigate the legislature's
responsibility for redistricting have an easy answer for their legislative
defeats: the self-interest of lawmakers. There is, though, another less
sensational explanation. The current system of redistricting works and
serves Virginia particularly well. Moreover, a better alternative has yet
to be created. In short, proponents of plans that would rely on
appointed bodies to draw new districts are offering a solution to a
nonexistent problem.
The current method of redistricting in Virginia is the only system that
has proven to be inclusive, representative, and practical. But more
importantly, it is the only method that makes legislators directly
accountable to the voters for the district boundaries they enact into law.
Since every Virginian is represented in the General Assembly by a
senator and a delegate, the current method of redistricting is the only
way to ensure that every Virginian has a voice in the process. Unelected
panels comprised of retired judges, like the one endorsed by the Virginia
Redistricting Coalition have no such guarantees of inclusiveness. 4
Additionally, because the panel would answer to those who appoint
them, they are further removed from the public and cannot compare to
the representative nature of an elected legislature.
Those promoting redistricting by the appointed instead of the elected
frequently compare such a process to the one employed by the federal
government's Defense Base Closure and Realignment ("BRAC")
Commission. 5 The idea is that a commission would create a proposal to
which the legislature would be required to give an up-or-down vote. 6
However, such comparisons are not really applicable. The purpose of
38, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (left in the House Privileges and Elections Committee); S.B.
243, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (incorporated into Senate Bill 38 by the Senate Privileges
and Elections Committee); S.J. Res. 5, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (left in the Senate
Privileges and Elections Committee); S.J. Res. 59, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (left in the
Senate Privileges and Elections Committee); see also Michael Sluss, House Committee Kills
Redistricting Legislation, ROANOKE TIMES (Va.), Feb. 18, 2009, at A10 (describing the vote by a House
of Delegates subcommittee to kill Senate Bill 926 and other redistricting legislation).
4. Three of the constitutional amendments that would allow for redistricting reform in the most recent
General Assembly session require that members of the commission be former judges and justices of
the Virginia courts. See H.J. Res. 181, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2009), § 6(d) (as introduced
Jan. 9, 2009), H.J. Res. 702, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2009), § 6(d) (as introduced Jan. 14,
2009); S.J. Res. 59, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2009), § 6(e) (as introduced Jan. 8, 2009).
5. The BRAC Commission was created by Congress in 2005 to provide an objective, non-partisan, and
independent review and analysis of the list of military installation recommendations issued by the
Department of Defense. Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-510,
§§ 2901-2911, 104 Stat. 1485, 1808-19 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (2006)).
6. See Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, Commission Process,
http://www.brac.gov/Process.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2009).
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LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING
the BRAC Commission was to reduce the number of military facilities in
order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of our national
security. 7  Considering that Virginia must comply with the strict
provisions of the Voting Rights Act, redistricting poses no such daunting
challenge.8
Judging from Virginia's most recent redistricting, the Commonwealth
appears to be drawing districts right the first time. The latest maps,
both legislative and congressional, adhere to court and code mandates
regarding the drawing of legislative districts. 9 The required features
include contiguity, compactness, and communities of interest. 10
As evidence of the current plan's success, not a single court case
challenging Virginia's current House of Delegates, Senate, or
Congressional maps prevailed.11 Furthermore, unlike successful contests
of the plans drawn for the 1980s and 1990s, no legal challenge remained
judicially viable beyond the first year after the plans for this decade were
drawn.
Critics of the current method frequently assert that the current lines
are unrepresentative of Virginia's electorate. 12 In fact, the opposite is
true. The current redistricting plan has reflected the votes of Virginians
with remarkable accuracy. In the 2007 elections for the Virginia House
of Delegates, forty-three percent of Virginians cast ballots for
Democratic nominees, 13 and the Democrats won forty-four of the one
7. See Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act § 2901(b).
8. The Voting Rights Act requires covered jurisdictions to obtain federal approval before making any
change to voting procedures. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REAUTHORIZATION OF THE TEMPORARY
PROVISIONS OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: AN EXAMINATION OF THE ACT'S SECTION 5 PRECLEARANCE
PROVISION 1 (2006), available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/060706VRAbrief524.pdf. Virginia is one
of the sixteen covered jurisdictions. Id. at 2.
9. See VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-303.2 (Cum. Supp. 2008), §§ 24.2-302.1, -303.1, -304.1 (Repl. Vol.
2006). District maps are available through the Virginia Division of Legislative Services. Va. Div. of
Legislative Servs., District Maps: 2001 Congressional District Maps, http://dlsgis.state.va.us/
congress/2001PDFs/chap7Tab.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2009); Va. Div. of Legislative Servs., District
Maps: 2001 House District Maps, http://dlsgis.state.va.us/House/2001HousePDFs/chapITab.pdf (last
visited Oct. 13, 2009); Va. Div. of Legislative Servs., District Maps: 2001 Senate District Maps,
http://dlsgis.state.va.us/senate/2001PDFs/Chap2Tab.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2009).
10. See VA. CONST. art. II, § 6; Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 91-92 (1997); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S.
952, 959-60 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 919 (1995); Shaw v. Reno (Shaw I), 509 U.S.
630, 637 (1993); DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F. Supp. 1409, 1414 (E.D. Cal. 1994), summarily aff'd, 515
U.S. 1170 (1995).
11. See, e.g., Hall v. Virginia, 385 F.3d 421, 423, 432 (4th Cir. 2004); Wilkins v. West, 264 Va. 447,
480, 571 S.E.2d 100, 119 (2002); Hall v. Warner, No. CH02-100, slip op. at 1 (Va. Cir. Apr. 17, 2002)
(order of nonsuit).
12. See Virginia Redistricting Coalition, About Redistricting: The Problem, http://www.fixthelines.org/
AboutRedistricting/TheProblem/tabid/565/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2009).
13. Washington Post Special Reports, Local Elections 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/metro/elections/2007/results/virginia assembly.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2009).
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hundred seats. 14 In the 2007 elections for the Virginia Senate, fifty-five
percent of Virginians cast ballots for Democratic nominees,15 and the
Democrats won twenty-one of the forty seats. 16 This testifies to the
accuracy of the current lines-especially in the House plan-and their
ability to reflect the expressed desire of Virginia voters.
As is true of most well-intended "reforms," those advancing an
appointed commission to perform redistricting claim their proposal will
bring about better government through "fairness" and
"competitiveness." ' 17  Considering that control of the Virginia Senate
switched from Republican to Democrat during this decade, those
claiming a lack of competitiveness find their arguments directly
challenged by election results. 18  The congressional delegation has
changed as well, going from majority Republican to majority
Democrat. 19 The House of Delegates has also seen a major shift in its
partisan makeup, going from a twenty-eight seat Republican majority in
200220 to an eight seat majority in 2009.21
A more complex issue is competitiveness, which is, at best, an elusive
concept. As the results of the 2008 presidential elections show, partisan
preferences within communities are not static. 22  Achieving
"competitiveness" for even a single election cycle would likely result in
drawing lines tortuously, cutting communities and localities, and creating
less compact districts. Competitiveness is not a constitutional, court, or
code requirement for redistricting for a very good reason: it directly
14. See generally Virginia State Board of Elections, Nov. 6, 2007 General Election Official Results,
https://www.voterinfo.sbe.virginia.gov (follow "Election Results" hyperlink; then follow "2007"
hyperlink; then follow "November 6, 2007 Election Results" hyperlink; then follow "House of
Delegates" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 17, 2009).
15. Washington Post Special Reports, supra note 13.
16. See generally Virginia State Board of Elections, Nov. 6, 2007 General Election Official Results,
https://www.voterinfo.sbe.virginia.gov (follow "Election Results" hyperlink; then follow "2007"
hyperlink; then follow "November 6, 2007 Election Results" hyperlink; then follow "State Senate"
hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 17, 2009).
17. See Virginia Redistricting Coalition, Virginia Needs Redistricting Reform,
http://www.fixthelines.org/Home/tabid/527/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 17,2009).
18. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
19. Virginia's Congressional delegation is comprised of five Republicans and six Democrats. 2009
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMONWEALTH 658-61,
http://www.commonwealth.virginia.gov/StateGovernment/BlueBook/report.cfm (follow "ll Virginia
Congressional Delegation pdf' hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 17, 2009).
20. See generally Legislative Information System, 2002 Session: General Assembly Members,
http://leg1.state.va.us/021/mbr/MBR.HTM (last visited Mar. 17, 2009).
21. See generally Legislative Information System, 2009 Session: General Assembly Members,
http://leg1.state.va.us/091/mbr/MBR.HTM (last visited Mar. 17, 2009).
22. In 2008, Barack Obama became the first Democratic presidential nominee in forty-four years to
carry Virginia, a traditionally red state. Tim Craig & Anita Kumar, Obama Beats McCain in Va.,
Ending 44-year GOP Reign, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2008, at A6.
20101
4
Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 12 [2008], Iss. 4, Art. 6
http://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol12/iss4/6
LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING
conflicts with other mandated requirements of drawing district lines.23
In many cases, competitiveness and the preservation of communities
of interest are inherently contradictory. How would a competitive
district be drawn in the high-population localities of Alexandria and
Arlington, for example? How could competitiveness be achieved while
adhering to the provisions of the Voting Rights Act? Those promoting
competitiveness as a principle for redistricting inadvertently discount a
more important concept. The centerpiece of representative democracy
is not limited to fostering debate in elections, but to enabling
representation for citizens of disparate views in decision-making
legislative bodies.
Even considering all these problems with assigning redistricting to an
appointed panel, the issue of accountability is even more perilous. The
only proven way to guarantee accountability in the redistricting process
is to have elected public officials-who must submit to the voters at
elections-be responsible for the lines. In contrast, appointed panels
would be accountable to those who appointed them. Since such
proposals customarily have elected officials doing the appointing, they
create a convenient buffer to prevent anything approaching direct
accountability. This fact alone makes changing the current system
undesirable.
Another argument offered in favor of removing redistricting from the
purview of elected representatives is to take the politics out of the
process, as if it would ever be possible to remove politics from an
inherently political process and body. What it would really do is shift
the politics to a less transparent level. The making of appointments
would become very political and would be more susceptible to backroom
deals, since fewer people would be involved.
Those who would have Virginia adopt redistricting by an unelected
commission frequently market their proposal as "bipartisan
redistricting." They would be well-advised to examine the results of the
most recent legislative elections more closely. Currently, Virginia's
House of Delegates has a Republican majority while its Senate has a
Democratic one. 24 Regardless of who is elected Governor this year, both
parties will play major roles in drawing district lines.
23. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
24. The 2009 House of Delegates is comprised of fifty-three Republicans, forty-five Democrats, and
two Independents; the 2009 Senate is made up of twenty-two Democrats and eighteen Republicans.
See generally Legislative Information System, 2009 Session: General Assembly Members,
http://leg1.state.va.us/091/mbr/MBR.HTM (last visited Mar. 17, 2009).
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In closing, it is no mistake that a clear majority of the states continue
to perform redistricting in the same manner they have since the final
ratification of the United States Constitution in 1789. This is because it
works and continues to work over two hundred years later.
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